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  26 
ABSTRACT 27 
Background    28 
Numerous screening and isolation strategies have been developed to address the rising trend in 29 
carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae (CPE).  Yet, potential mismatches between demand for CPE 30 
screening and capacity are a threat to implementation.   This study estimates the demand in (i) testing and 31 
(ii) inpatient days requiring contact precautions, if all inpatients in high risk specialties were screened for CPE 32 
in a West London hospital network. 33 
Methods     34 
Clinical specialties in three teaching hospitals were ranked by prevalence of carbapenem-resistant 35 
Escherichia coli and Klebsiella spp. for the 2014/15 Financial Year (FY).  The number of inpatients admitted to 36 
each specialty during this period were extracted from the hospital management information system and 37 
stratified by length of stay.  The expected number of screening tests and inpatient days requiring contact 38 
precautions (including lag time for test results), were estimated for three iterative inclusion strategies.  These 39 
were based on incorporating the highest ranking specialties sequentially: 1) circulation science and renal 40 
medicine only; 2) plus critical care, anaesthesia, neurology and neurosurgery, orthopaedic and reconstructive 41 
surgery; and 3) plus private patients.   The potential fraction of the total CPE burden detectable through each 42 
strategy was estimated.   43 
Result      44 
Of the 99,105 inpatients recorded in the three hospitals in FY2014/15, strategies 1, 2 and 3 would have 45 
screened 4,371 (4.4%), 7,483 (7.6%) and 13,543 (13.7%).  Assuming pre-emptive isolation of those 46 
undergoing screening was implemented, the requirement for contact precautions would require  22.3%, 47 
40.6% and 60.6% of potential isolation bed days, respectively.  Strategies 1, 2 and 3 would have had detected 48 
17.1%, 27.8% and 47.5% of the total expected CPE burden. Marked variation in these variables was identified 49 
between hospitals. 50 
 51 
Discussion 52 
CPE screening is likely to generate considerable additional demand in terms of screening tests and patient 53 
isolation, especially if pre-emptive isolation is employed.  We demonstrate that screening patients admitted 54 
to high risk specialties could identify up a high proportion of CPE likely to be present at the time of admission. 55 
However, a substantial number of CPE cases will occur outside these 'high risk' specialties. The development 56 
of screening strategies for CPE needs to balance risk and resource.  57 
 58 
 59 
  60 
INTRODUCTION 61 
 62 
Enterobacteriaceae are ubiquitous human commensals, yet also a frequent cause of hospital-acquired 63 
infections.   Infections caused by Escherichia coli and Klebsiella pneumoniae are associated with urinary 64 
catheters,1 ventilators,2 and intravenous cannulae.3  The rise in antimicrobial resistance among these 65 
organisms, has driven the use of alternative classes of antimicrobials, notably carbapenems.4  In 66 
consequence, carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae and, within these, carbapenemase-producing 67 
Enterobacteriaceae (CPE), have emerged and spread.5  While all carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae 68 
are of concern, CPE pose a significant public health threat due to the potential for rapid spread and ease of 69 
transmission of these resistance mechanisms6 to other bacteria.    70 
 71 
The emerging threat to global health from CPE has prompted several national7-9 and international bodies10  72 
to develop screening guidelines.11-12   The Public Health England (PHE) Toolkit was published in December 73 
201313 and attempts to implement it have generated numerous questions.14   There is limited data on the 74 
proportion of patients that are likely to be eligible for screening, the relative demand in tests and contact 75 
precautions that are likely to be generated, and the potential mismatch with available capacities.     76 
    77 
This analysis proposes to address these questions by prioritizing the CPE screening to all the inpatients in 78 
specialties at higher risk for CPE.   Risk factors for CPE include hospitalisation in intensive care and renal 79 
units.15  Prioritising the CPE screening to high-risk specialties would be, compared with individual risk-factor 80 
based screening: (a) easier to administer, as it would be part of the admission protocols for all the patients 81 
admitted in these units; (b) potentially associated with higher impact, as these patients are more at risk of 82 
suffering from severe complications of CPE infections, and (c) cost-saving, if the screening successfully 83 
prevent outbreaks in these high-cost units.   84 
 85 
The aim of this study is to estimate the demand for screening tests and burden of contact precautions on the  86 
available capacity.   87 
 88 
 89 
METHODS  90 
     91 
Setting 92 
 93 
Three West London teaching hospitals were selected for this study. In FY2014/15, there were 32,884, 20,849 94 
and 45,372 admissions in hospital A, B and C respectively.  The number of single rooms with a toilet, which 95 
are suitable for isolation capacity, in hospital A, B and C were 114, 106 and 62 respectively.  96 
 97 
Priority specialties 98 
 99 
Data from Freeman et.16 was used to rank the specialties to be prioritised by the CPE screening.   The 100 
proportion of carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella spp. and Escherichia coli across the clinical specialities was: 101 
Circulation Science and Renal Medicine (cardiology, cardiothoracic surgery, renal transplant, renal dialysis, 102 
vascular surgery, rheumatology) 10.1%; Specialist Services (critical care, anaesthesia, neurology and 103 
neurosurgery, orthopaedic and reconstructive surgery) 8.8%; Private Patients 8.4%; Medicine (emergency, 104 
clinical pharmacology, endocrinology, gastroenterology, hepatology, genitourinary medicine, infectious 105 
diseases, medicine for the elderly, respiratory medicine and stroke medicine) 3.8%; Surgery and cancer 106 
(general surgery, breast surgery, endocrine surgery, hepatobiliary surgery, urology and oncology) 2.2%. 107 
 Strategy 1 was screening all the inpatients in Circulation Science and Renal Medicine; Strategy 2 was 108 
Strategy 1 + Critical Care; Strategy 3 was Strategy 2 + Private Patients.  109 
 110 
Demand 111 
 112 
The laboratory demand is based on three consecutive negative tests at 0, 48 and 96 hours According to the 113 
PHE Toolkit, with positive results being followed up by one confirmatory test.   However, not all inpatients 114 
stay long enough to receive all three screens, so we modified our calculations to account for this using length 115 
of stay data for each specialty for FY2014/15. The patient management demand assumes that pre-emptive 116 
contact precautions are implemented, in a single room where possible. According to the PHE Toolkit,13 each 117 
patient should be testedat 0, 48 and 96 hours.   118 
Capacities 119 
 120 
We have calculated the potential isolation bed day consumption comparing the number of bed days 121 
generated for the isolation of those undergoing CPE with the number of bed days avaiable in the hospitals 122 
(number of single rooms suitable for isolation x 365 days in a year). The assumption is that a hospital with a 123 
higher availability of potential isolation bed days is more able to respond to the extra demand in inpatient 124 
day equivalents in contact precautions required by the CPE screening.   125 
         126 
  127 
Potential detection rate 128 
 129 
It was assumed that sensitivity and specificity of the CPE tests were 100%.   According to this rationale, the 130 
expected number of positive cases was equal to the number of inpatients in the specialties at risk multiplied 131 
by the proportion of carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella species and Escherichia coli by specialty according to 132 
Freeman et al.   The expected number of carbapenem-resistant positive cases that were generated by each 133 
strategy was divided by the total expected cases in the whole hospital network.   Although this detection rate 134 
is related to carbapenem-resistant bacteria, this should reflect the “potential“ detection rate of CPE too, as 135 
CPE are a fraction of the carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae, assuming that the ratio of CRE:CPE is 136 
equal across the specialties. 137 
  138 
RESULTS 139 
 140 
Of the 99,105 admissions recorded in this network for FY2014/15,  4,371 (4.4%), 7,483 (7.6%) and 13,543 141 
(13.7%) would have fallen under the Strategy 1, 2, and 3,  respectively (Figure 1).  The variation would have 142 
been higher across hospitals, with Strategy 3 (the most comprehensive) covering 4971 or 23.8% of total 143 
inpatients in hospital B, versus 5,871  or 12.9% in hospital C and  2,700 or 8.2% in hospital A.    144 
 145 
Fig 1  Proportion of admissions falling under each strategy  146 
 147 
The annual expected consumption of inpatient isolation days for contact precautions increased substantially 148 
between Strategy 1 and Strategy 3.   For the whole network, Strategy 1 would have produced 14,551 contact 149 
precautions bed days between the first and third negative test and 8,400 contact precautions bed days 150 
between the expected positive tests and their discharge,  for a total of 22,951 contact precautions bed days.   151 
Similarly, Strategies 2 and 3 would have generated a total of 41,775 and 62,388 contact precautions bed days.         152 
 153 
For the network, the ratio of available isolation room bed days and contact precautions bed day requirements 154 
would increase from 22.3% to 60.6% between Strategy 1 and Strategy 3 (Figure 3).    For individual hospitals, 155 
the lowest ratio would have been in hospital B, while it would have varied between less than 1% and 72.6% 156 
in hospital A and between 18.1% and 120.9% in hospital C. A ratio above 100% was a sign of excessive demand 157 
vs. the available capacity.         158 
 159 
Fig 2    Inpatient day equivalents in contact precautions as % of potential isolation bed days  160 
 161 
There was a substantial variation in potential detection rates of CPE.    For the whole network, strategy 1, 2 162 
and 3 would have potentially detected 17.1%, 27.8% and 47.5%.    For hospitals, the detection rates would 163 
have had a much higher variation with the most comprehensive strategy 3 allowing to potentially detect 164 
88.6% of the total expected CPE positive cases in Hospital B, versus 48.0% in hospital C and 27.3% in hospital 165 
A.    166 
 167 
Fig 4 Detection rate by strategy 168 
 169 
  170 
DISCUSSION 171 
 172 
A threat to the implementation of the CPE screening could come from failing to keep up with the demand for 173 
tests and contact precautions.    This study has used routinary available data to predict the impact of 174 
screening all the admissions in the high-risk specialties in FY2014/15.    The most comprehensive Strategy 3 175 
(screening all admissions to circulation scince and renal, critical care, and private patients) would have 176 
included a maximum of 13,543 or 13.7% of all inpatients in the hospital network.   This coverage is likely to 177 
be easier to implement and more sustainable than individual risk-factor based screening of patients with a 178 
history of hospitalisation abroad on in high-risk NHS hospital, which according to a survey carried out by a 179 
West London hospital could include 20% of all inpatients.18   We could not find other estimates on the 180 
expected demand that the inclusion criteria of the previous hospitalisation abroad on in high-risk hospitals 181 
would have generated.   The main advantage of using the “specialty at risk“ approach was the possibility of 182 
using available hospital management data to compare the demand for testing and inpatient day equivalents 183 
in contact precautions with the available capacity.   Furthermore, screening all inpatients in high-risk 184 
specialties would be administered through existing admission procedures.  185 
 186 
The hospital network's capacity to detect most of the total CPE burden would have varied substantially across 187 
hospitals.   Hospital  A would have had the lowest proportion of admissions belonging to the target groups 188 
and thus the lowest fraction of the total expected positive cases.    In other words, most of the CPE positive 189 
cases in this hospitals would have been occurred outside the target specialties at risk.   This is due to the fact 190 
that although the prevalence was much lower in the specialties that were not included in the screening, the 191 
number of patients in these specilaties contributed to a substantial number of CPE cases.   In contrast, 192 
hospital B would have had the highest proportion of admissions belonging to high- risk specialties and thus 193 
the highest potential detection rate.    This shows that whatever inclusion criteria is adopted for screening, it 194 
is necessary to evaluate in each hospital the expected fraction of the total CPE burden that would be 195 
potentially detected. 196 
 197 
Limitations 198 
 199 
We have used proxies to assess the potential mismatch between incremental demand in contact precautions 200 
and available capacity.   We have divided the total expected number of days incurred between consecutive 201 
tests by the total available physical isolation capacity in terms of single beds with toilet.   Further research is 202 
needed to devise indicators to estimate the demand and capacity in staff time and supplies required to 203 
manage the screened cases. Our estimation of burden of contact precautions would be considerably lower if 204 
pre-emptive isolation was not performed.  205 
 206 
Sensitivity and specificity were assumed to be 100%.    Although this will not be the case, it is unlikely to affect 207 
the demand for tests and inpatient day equivalents in contact precautions estimated by this study.  In fact, 208 
at the present low incidence rates of CPE, most of the demand will be generated by the negative cases 209 
undergoing three consecutive tests and contributing to most contact precautions bed days.      210 
 211 
It has been assumed that the tests will be carried out at an interval of 48 hours between each other.   This is 212 
based on the present guidelines and it does not take into account potential increase in the turnaround time 213 
that might be caused by excessive workload of the laboratory staff.    214 
       215 
Implications of the results  216 
 217 
The results show that targeting CPE screening in specialties at higher risk provides an evidence-based 218 
platform to match the demand in contact precautions with the available capacities.   However, the efficiency 219 
of the inclusion criteria will depend on their ability to detect the highest potential fraction of the total CPE 220 
burden.   Even if the target groups are selected according to their higher incidence rates, screening might fail 221 
to capture most of the potential CPE burden, especially if these target groups are relatively small in some of 222 
the hospitals.    223 
 224 
Screening all the admissions to specialties at higher risk for CPE is likely to be simpler, compared with other 225 
inclusion criteria, and likely to prevent the worst consequences of CPE transmission.   For example, with the 226 
PHE inclusion criteria, the admission staff will have to ask questions about previous hospitalisations in NHS 227 
high-risk hospitals, which is difficult to standardise.   Instead, the existing administrative set up can be used 228 
to screen all the admissions and transfers to target specialties at risk and to extract the data to monitor the 229 
implementation of the screening.    Furthermore, CPE associated mortality is highest in ICU and other 230 
specialties at risk and identifying carriers and infected patients before they enter these specialties would help 231 
to prevent transmission where it is most needed.   232 
 233 
Conclusions 234 
 235 
The study has provided a method to prioritise the screening, to estimate the expected number of tests and 236 
inpatient days equivalents of contact precautions and to compare demand with available capacity.   This 237 
approach can provide a planning tool to identify the best alternatives in terms of inclusion criteria and 238 
sustainable demand for screening. 239 
 240 
Next steps 241 
 242 
The limitations of the study suggest the gaps still to be filled to estimate the cost-effectiveness of inclusion 243 
strategies for the CPE screening.   These include the following: 244 
 Estimation of CRE and CPE incidence rates for carriers and infected cases by specialty;  245 
 Estimation of the transmission rates for carriers and infected cases; 246 
 Standardized laboratory testing algorithm with a validation system  to estimate sensitivity and 247 
specificity; 248 
 Quantification of the relationship between number of CPE tests and turnaround times;  249 
 Diagnostic costs per positive and negative case; 250 
 Daily requirements in staff time and supplies to attend screened patients; 251 
 Daily expected cost caused by the closure of high-risk specialties;  252 
 Measures of effectiveness for CPE screening, such as the reduction of the CPE related blood stream 253 
infections. 254 
     255 
The above-mentioned gaps require a more efficient use of hospital management information systems.   There 256 
are several data systems including: (a) the patient administration systems, (b) laboratory information 257 
management systems, (c) pharmacy/dispensary/electronic prescribing systems, and (d) clinical notation 258 
systems.  However, information is not always directly usable for extraction and analysis, and mechanisms to 259 
enable data warehousing and linkage are needed.18    260 
 261 
Need a strong concluding paragraph – what are the take-home messages of the study? 262 
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